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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SISCO HILTE AND ZURICH AMERICAN 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
Case No. 870592-CA 
vs. 
LESTER WAYNE SMITH and THE (Case Priority No. 6) 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS LESTER WAYNE SMITH 
and THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Was the Industrial Commission arbitrary and capricious in 
awarding benefits L. Wayne Smith following the lifting of a 
steel plate weighing at least 50 lbs. with an immediate onset of 
pain. 
Jurisdictional Statement 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 35-1-83 (Supp. 1986). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASE 
The procedural portion of the case is governed by Utah Code 
Annotated § 35-1-84 and §35-1-85 (Supp. 1986) (Addendum A) 
Substantively, the case is governed by Utah Code Annotated § 35-
1-45 (Supp. 1986) (Addendum B) as interpreted by Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) (Addendum C). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
Respondent, L. Wayne Smith claimed and was awarded benefits 
by the Industrial Commission. 
B. Court of Proceedings and Disposition bv the Industrial 
Commission; 
1. Lester Wayne Smith filed an Application for Hearing 
before the Industrial Commission on August 26, 1986, as a result 
of an accident on March 25, 1986. (R. at 4) 
2. The Application for Hearing was filed because the 
Appellants had denied responsibility for medical treatment, 
payment of temporary total disability compensation and permanent 
partial disability compensation to Respondent. (R. at 4) 
3. The Appellants continue to deny that Smith suffered a 
compensable industrial accident. (R. at 7) 
4. A Hearing was held on December 4, 1986 at which 
Respondent Smith presented testimony. No fact witnesses were 
called by Appellants. (R 9-45) 
5. After the hearing the matter was referred to a medical 
panel. (R. at 273-278) The medical panel determined that there 
was a causal connection between the applicants low back problems 
and the industrial accident of March 25, 1986. They further 
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decided that the industrial injury aggravated a pre-existing 
condition. (R. at 280-286) 
6. Following the decision by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) the 
Administrative Law Judge allowed the parties to fully brief the 
causation issue as it related to the fact of the case. (R. at 
257, 258-261, 262-264 and 265-266) 
7. The Administrative Law Judge then issued her Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in which she found that 
there was an industrial accident, that applicant had met the 
burden of legal causation and medical causation as required by 
Allen, supra. (R. at 290-296) (See Addendum D) 
8. A Motion for Review was filed by Appellants challenging 
the Administrative Law Judge's Findings. (R. at 297-298 and 
300-301) 
9. The entire Industrial Commission upheld the 
Administrative Law Judge's Findings that an industrial accident 
occurred and that respondent has meet the tests set forth in 
Allen, supra. (R. at 305-307) (See Addendum E) 
10. A Petition for Review has been filed with the Utah 
Court of Appeals seeking review of the Industrial Commission's 
award of benefits. (R. at 308-309) 
C. Statement of Facts 
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1. Wayne Smith on March 25, 1986, was moving a stack of 
steel plate. 
2. The steel plate was all 3/8 of an inch thick and varied 
in size from 8 to 12 feet long with a width of from 12 to 14 
inches. (R. at 14) Each sheet weighed 50 to 80 lbs. He had 
moved 2 or 3 sheets. (Record at 15) 
3. He bent over to pick up the next plate of steel and was 
holding it with his left hand on the bottom and right hand on 
the top while bent at the back. As he picked up the sheet from 
10" off the ground to waist height he felt a snap in his back 
and a sharp pain go down his right leg. That sheet weighed at 
least 50 lbs. (R. at 15 and 16) 
4. The accident was immediately reported to Smith's boss 
who kept Smith in the office the remainder of the day 
(approximately 2 hours) also suggested that Smith seek medical 
attention. (R. at 15 and 18). 
5. When applicant got home the pain had become worse. The 
pain was is his back just above his waist and down his right 
leg. (R. at 19) 
6. The next morning applicant went to see Dr. Kenneth G. 
Hansen, D.C., who treated him with chiropractic manipulations 
for approximately seven weeks, then referred him to Allen T. 
Hunstock, M.D. on May 9, 1986. (R. at 22 and 232) 
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7. On May 28, 1986, Dr. Hunstock performed a right L/5 
laminotomy with an L5-S1 diskectomy to repair a herniated L5-S1 
disk. (R. at 174-175) 
8. Although, at the time of the hearing, L. Wayne Smith 
did not recall pre-existing back problems, (R. at 33-36) the 
medical records of Dr. Mendenhall demonstrate a prior back 
injury for which Mr. Smith was hospitalized from April 10, 1980 
through April 12, of 1980. No surgery was performed and he was 
discharged without medications. (R. at 92-11P) 
9. Smith continued treating with Dr. John P. Mendenhall, 
M. D. through June 5, 1980, at which point the doctor noted 
"Patient's muscle tone now is near normal. Symptoms are 
remarkably improved. Straight leg raising is normal". (R. at 
220-221) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission's determination that Wayne Smith 
is entitled to workers compensation benefits is neither contrary 
to law or contrary to the evidence presented at the hearing. 
There is substantial evidence to support the decision of both 
the Administrative Law Judge and Industrial Commission. 
The finding is consistent with recognized case law as 
lifting long, thin steel plate weighing at least 50 lbs. is 
unusual and extraordinary exertion sufficient to meet the first 
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prong of the test adopted in Allen v. Industrial Commission. 
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). The items lifted, the manner in which 
they were lifted and the weight of the steel bands are in no way 
similar to any risks faced in ordinary non-employment life. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONS FINDINGS MUST STAND 
BECAUSE THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
AND ARE NEITHER ARBITRARY NOR CAPRICIOUS 
The standard of review for cases filed in the Industrial 
Commission before January 1, 1988, allows a reviewing Court to 
set aside the Commission award only after finding that either 
the act was beyond the Commissions authority or was unsupported 
by the actual findings. Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-84 (1974). 
The Administrative Law Judge and Industrial Commission were 
aware of the Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 
1986) when this case was decided. The Administrative Law Judge 
and Commission applied the facts as presented at the hearing to 
the standards set forth in Allen and determined that Smith had 
established that the legal cause of his injury was the lifting 
of steel bars on March 25, 1986. Disturbing their findings in 
this case would be inappropriate. 
The Commissions findings should be evaluated in the light 
most favorable to such findings and should not be disturbed if 
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there is evidence of any substance to support the finding. 
Savage v. Industrial Commission. 565 P.2d 782, 783 (Utah 1977) 
and Griffiths v. Industrial Commission. 82 Utah Adv.Rep.51 (Ct. 
App. May 18, 1988). A reviewing Court must affirm the 
Commissions findings unless they are 
arbitrary and capricious, and they are arbitrary 
and capricious when they are contrary to the evidence or 
without any reasonable basis in the evidence Rushton v. 
Gelco Express. 732 P.2d 109, 111 (Utah 1986) quoted in 
American Roofing Company v. Industrial Commission. 80 
Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 16 (Ct. App. April 13, 1988) 
The record contains ample evidence to support the Commissions 
decision. For that reason, the Commissions award should be 
affirmed. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT L. WAYNE SMITH WAS INJURED BY AN 
ACCIDENT WHILE PERFORMING A TASK WITH A RISK 
SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN EVERYDAY LIFE. 
An injured worker who seeks to obtain workers compensation 
benefits must prove, pursuant to § 35-1-45 Utah Code Annotated 
(1987) that he was injured "by an accident arising out or in the 
course of his employment". That statue has been interpreted by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Allenf supra, to require first a 
showing that an accident has occurred and a causal connection 
between the injury and the employment duties. The causation 
standard has both a legal and medical counterpart. 
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In this case, the medical prong of the causal connection 
test has been met by applicant's treating doctors and by the 
medical panel. (R. at 280-286, 232-239 and 243-247) Appellants 
raise no issue as to medical causation. Further, there appears 
to be no question but that he was injured "by accident." The 
principle issue presented by Plaintiff's Appellants is whether 
the Respondent L. Wayne Smith satisfied the "legal" causation 
tests of Allen. supra. 
A. Smith's injury was caused by the lifting incident at 
work. 
There is no question or controversy surrounding Smith's 
assertion that he was injured when lifting the steel plate. He 
testified that he felt a pop and had pain associated with the 
lifting the plate. His treating doctors as well as the medical 
panel found that there was a causal connection between the 
industrial injury and his low back problems. The Administrative 
Law Judge and Industrial Commission found that connection 
appropriate. 
No contradictory evidence has been presented by Appellants 
to support a claim that L. Wayne Smith's disk herniation and 
requiring surgery on any occasion other than the date of the 
industrial accident identified as to time and place has having 
occurred on March 25, 1986. Unquestionably, he did have a 
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"unusual event" immediately surrounding lifting one of the steel 
plates. 
B. Smiths exertion at the time he was injured was 
extraordinary and unusual when compared to non-
emplovment activities of his peers. 
Wayne Smith, on the day he was injured, was involved in 
moving steel plates 8 to 12 feet long, 12 to 14 inches wide and 
3/8 of an inch thick from the top of a stack containing 30 to 40 
plates. He had moved 2 or 3 such plates and was just beginning 
to pick up the 3rd or 4th plate when his back snapped. 
Applicant testified: 
Q What were you doing actually as your back 
snapped? Do you understand my question? 
A I was bent over picking up the plate of steel. 
Q Had you lifted it some distance from the other 
pieces of steel? 
A Yes. 
Q And how were you holding it? 
A In both of my hands. I had one hand on the 
bottom of it and one hand on the top of the plate of 
steel. 
Q And which hand was on the bottom? 
A My left. 
Q Was the right hand on the top to steady it? 
A Yes. 
Q How were you? Were you bent at the knee, 
bent at the back? 
A Bent at the back. 
Q How far off the ground was this particular piece of 
steel? 
A Well, it was sitting on—there were probably 30 or 
40 plates of steel, and it was on the top. 
Q So would that make it two feet, three feet off the 
ground? 
A Oh, about ten inches, probably. 
Q And how far had you lifted it before you felt your 
back snap or pop? 
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A About a foot and a half. 
ME. CHAI: A foot and a half off the ground, or a foot 
and a half from the top of the stack? 
THE WITNESS: A foot and a half from the top of the 
stack. (Record at 16-17) 
Respondent submits that carrying objects such as those 
carried by Smith in the manner they were carried is not an 
exertion of everyday life. Applicant is unable to imagine any 
activities undertaken by "men and women in the later part of the 
twentieth century" Allen, supra at 26 which bear any similarity 
to the incident described by Smith* The manner in which Smith 
moved the plate from one area to another using one hand on top 
and one hand on the bottom of a 14 foot length could not be 
characterized as anything but awkward. The dimensions of the 
plate itself makes it very different from items regularly or 
routinely carried by the general public. Coupling the size of 
the plate with the density and weight of steel, supports no 
finding other than that lifting and moving such steel would 
involve unusual exertion. 
The Court of Appeals recently applied the Allen standard to 
another lifting incident. In American Roofing, supra George 
Ray Green suffered a back injury while attempting to unload a 
thirty pound, bucket out of his truck. In affirming the 
Commission's Finding of compensability, the Court stated: 
"...[E]vidence of the weight, with the manner in which 
10 
Green lifted the bucket and the fact that the bucket 
snagged, combined to characterize Green's actions as 
unusual or extraordinary under the Allen definition. 
American Roofing has failed to establish that such a 
finding is arbitrary and capricious. American 
Roofing, supra at 17. 
The decision in American Roofing, supra. gives further 
support to the Commission's finding of compensability in this 
case. The weight of the object lifted is not the only criteria 
to be used. It should coupled with the manner of lifting and 
the other circumstance surrounding the injury. 
It should further be noted that at no point in the cases 
decided by the Utah Supreme Court or Court of Appeals applying 
the Allen standard, has a weight limit been set. Applicant 
asserts that few persons, and certainly not the majority of the 
population, routinely lift fifty pound, objects. Although there 
may occasionally be instances where people lift fifty pounds 
under ordinary non-industrial circumstances, the lifting of a 12 
ft. by 14 in. piece of metal with one hand under the metal to 
lift it and the other on top for stability is not ordinary. It 
is in no way similar to or comparable with lifting baggage, 
taking garbage cans to the street, lifting children, groceries 
or tires. Once children reach 20 to 25 lbs. they are rarely 
carried. Garbage cans or tires are normally lifted with both 
hands. It is ludicrous to suggest the average person totes 
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groceries or any other items weighing fifty pounds on a regular 
basis. 
Clearly, the incident described by applicant involved 
lifting an item of unusual dimensions weighing more than the 
average person carries. The exertion in no way compares with 
those exertions of the average man or women. Thus, the 
Industrial Commission's decision is supported by the law and 
evidence and should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission correctly found that Respondent, 
L. Wayne Smith, was injured by an accident at work. The 
Commission was also correct in finding that at the time of his 
injury, Mr. Smith was involved in a task which required exertion 
substantially greater than that to which persons are ordinarily 
exposed. 
Because the Industrial Commission's ruling is fairly 
supported by the evidence in the case and is neither arbitrary 
or capricious, it should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this £_ day of June, 1988. 
SMITHBR.DOC ( ( J \ ^ — y 
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ADDENDUM 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-84 A-l 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-85 A-2 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 B-l 
Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 C-l 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order E-l 
Order Denying Motion For Review D-l 
ADDENDUM "h" 
ADDENDUM "K" 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-84 (Supp. 1965) 
FURNISHING AND CERTIFYING PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSCRIPT 
TO SUPREME COURT - POWER OF COURT TO AFFIRM OR SET ASIDE 
AWARD - GROUNDS FOR SETTING ASIDE. 
Upon filing of the action for review the Court shall 
direct the Commission to furnish and certify to the 
Supreme Court, within twenty days# all proceedings and the 
transcript of evidence taken in the case, and the matter 
shall be determined upon the record of the Commission 
as certified by it. Upon such review the Court may affirm 
or set aside such award, but only upon the following 
grounds: 
(1) That the Commission acted without or in excess of 
its powers; 
(2) That the findings of fact do not support the 
award. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-85 (Supp. 1953) 
DUTY OF COMMISSION TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW - FILING - CONCLUSIVENESS ON QUESTIONS OF FACT -
REVIEW - COURT JUDGMENT 
After each formal hearing, it shall be the duty of the 
Commission to make findings of fact and conclusions of law 
in writing and file the same with its secretary. The 
findings and conclusions of the Commission on questions of 
fact shall be conclusive and final and shall not be subject 
to review; such questions of fact shall include ultimate 
facts and the findings and conclusions of the Commission. 
The Commission and every party to the action or proceeding 
before the Commission shall have the right to appear in the 
review proceeding. Upon the hearing the Court shall enter 
judgment either affirming or setting aside the award. 
ADDENDUM A-1,2 
ADDENDUM " B " 
ADDENDUM "K» 
Utah Code Ann, § 35-1-45 (Supp. 1986) : 
COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS TO BE PAID, 
Every employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who 
is injured, and the dependents of every such employee who 
is killed, by accident arising out of or in the course of 
his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the 
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid 
compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or 
death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital 
services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount 
of funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter. The 
responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, 
nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral 
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the 
employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee. 
ADDEMDUM B-l 
ADDENDUM "C 
ALLEN v IM)1 
Cite a» 729 FJL 
Robert A. ALLEN, Plaintiff. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. Board of 
Review, Jer Ken. Inc.. State Insurance 
Fund and Second Injun Fund, Defend 
anu 
No. 20026 
Supreme Coun of Utah 
Nov. 14, 198C 
Worker, who sustained lower back in 
juries while stacking milk crates containing 
four to six gallons of milk, sought review 
of an order of the Industrial Commission, 
denying his motion for review of an order 
of an administrative law judge denying his 
workers compensation clam. The Su-
preme Coun, Durham, J., held that: (1) 
finding that worker s injury was not "by 
accident* was not based on the evidence 
and. thus, was erroneous, but (2* worker's 
claim would be remanded for further fac; 
finding as to whetner action of worker, 
who had previous back problems, in lifting 
several piles of milK crates exceeded exer 
tion whicn average person typically under 
took in nonempioyment life and whetner 
medically demonstrable causal link existed 
between worker's lifting and injur} to his 
back 
Vacated and remanded 
Hall, CJ.. filed opinion concurring ir 
pan and dissenting in pan, with Siewan. 
Associate CJ., joining in the dissent 
Stewan, Associate CJ.. dissented and 
filed opinion. 
1. Evidence *=>lt 
Supreme Coun took judicial notice that 
liquid mil*, weighs about the same as liquid 
water or approximately eight and one-third 
pounds per gallon: thus, four gallons of 
milk weigh about 88 pound? without the 
container* and crate, and six gallons of 
milk weigh about 50 pounds without con 
tamers and crate 
STR1AL COM N Utah 15 
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2. Worker*' Compensation c=»515 
For purposes of workers compens^ 
tion. key requirement of an "accident* is 
tna: occurrence t* unanticipated ur 
planned, anc unintended where either 
cause of injury or result of exemor is 
different from wnat would normally oe e> 
pectea to occur, occurrence is unplanned 
unforeseen, and umntendec and, thus, by 
"accident'; clarifying Carixng v. Industri-
al Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2c 
202. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-4: 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions 
3. Workers* Compensation *=>515 
For purposes of workers' compensa-
tion, proof of unusual event may be helpful 
in determining causa) connection between 
injury and employment; however, proof of 
unusual event is not required as an element 
of requirement that injury be "by acci-
dent " U.C.A.1953, 85-1-45 
4. Workers' Compensation «»515 
An "accident/' for purposes of require-
ment that injury be "by accident" to be 
compensable under Workers' Compensator 
Act. is an unexpected or unintended occur-
rence that may be either tne cause or thf 
result of an injur}-; abandoning Redmar. 
Warehousing Corp i Industrial 
Coram n. 22 Utah 2d 39b. 454 P.2d 283. 
Church of Jesus Chris! of Latter-Dap 
Saints t Industrial Commission, 590 
P.2d 328 (Utah); Farmers Grain Cooper-
ativi t Mason, 606 ?M ZSVtUtah); 
Sabo's Elec Sen. if Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 
(Utah). Billings Computer Corp. i\ Tar-
ango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah). U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-45 
5. Workers* Compensation *»56S 
Key question in workers' compensation 
case in determining causation is whether, 
given worker's body and workers exertion, 
tne exertion in fact contributed to the inju-
ry U.C.A.1953. 35-1-45 
6. Workers* Compensation C»552. 568 
Only those injuries which occur be-
cause some condition or exertion required 
by employment increases risk of injury 
ADDENDUM C-l 
I f Utar 72* PACIFIC REPORTER 2d SERIES 
which worker normally face? in his every-
day life is compensable under Worker/ 
Compensation Aci: injuries which coinc 
dentally occur at work because preexisting 
condition results in symptoms which appeal-
durmp work hours witnout any enhance-
ment from the work piace are not compel 
sabit. U.C.A.1953. 35-1-45 
7. Workers' Compensation =^^ 597 
For purposes of workers compensa 
tion. two-pan causation test, requinng con-
sideration of legal cause and medical caust 
of injury, is required in determining whetr 
er causal connection exists between injun 
and workers employment; abandoning 
Billings Computer Corp. x. Tarango, 674 
P.2d 104 (Utah); Sabo's Elec. Sen. t. 
Sabo. 642 P.2d 722 (Utah): Church of Je-
sus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Indus-
trial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah;. 
IGA Food Fair t. Martin. 584 P.2d 82> 
(Utah). Nuzum i. Roosendahl Construe 
txon and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144 
(Utah j. Jones r. California Packing 
Corp.. 123 Utah 612. 244 P.2d 640; Robert-
son v. Industrial Commission. 109 Utah 
25, 163 P.2d 331; Thomas D. Dee Memori-
al Hospital Assn v. Industrial Commis 
sion. 104 Utah 61. 138 P.2d 233; Kaiser 
Steel Corp v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 88^ 
(Utah): Schmidt t Industrial Commit 
sion. 617 P.2d 693 (Utah); Residential and 
Commercial Construction Co. i. Indus-
trial Commission 529 P.2d 427 (Utah) 
Pouvn i. Industrial Commission, 1^ 
Utah 2d 140. 427 P.2d 740; Baker v. Indus 
trial Commission. 17 Utah 2G 141, 405 
P.2d 613; Purity Biscuit Co. t. Industrial 
Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45 
8. W orkers* Compensation *=>553 
Where claimant suffers from preexist-
ing condition which contributes to injury, 
unusual or extraordinary exertion is re-
quired to prove "legal causation." for pur-
poses of two-pan causation test for deter-
mining whether causa! connection exists 
between claimant s injury and claimant's 
employment: where there is no preexisting 
condition, a usual or an ordinary exertion is 
sufficient to prove legal causation U.C.A 
1953. 3r- l -4: 
9. Workers' Compensation *=»59? 
For purposes of legal causation ele 
men: of two-pan test for determining 
whether causal connection exists betweer 
claimants injury and claimants employ-
ment, precipitating exeruon must be com 
pared with usual wear and tear and exer-
tions of nonemployment life of people in 
general, not nonempioyment life of the par-
ticular claimant in question U.C.A.1953. 
35-1-45 
10. Workers* Compensation G=>597 
Under medical causation portion of 
two-pan test for determining whether 
causal connection exists between claimants 
injury* and claimant s employment, claimant 
must show by evidence, opinion, or other-
wise that stress, strain, or exertion re 
quired by his or her occupation led to re-
sulting injury or disability. U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-45 
11. Workers* Compensation e»1390 
Evidence of ordinariness or usualness 
of employ ees exertions may be relevant to 
medical conclusion of causal connection be-
tween claimant's injury and claimant s em-
ployment U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
12. Workers* Compensation *=»1533 
Finding that claimant's lower back in-
jury was not "by accident' as claimant was 
stacking milk crates was not based on the 
evidence and. thus, was erroneous; claim-
ant expenenced unexpected and unantic-
ipated injury to his back as beJifted crate 
of milk in cramped area of cooler, claimant 
had not complained of pain or limitations at 
his job, and no evidence indicated that inju-
ry was predictable or developed gradually 
as with occupational disease or progressive 
back disorder. U.C.A.1953, 8CK)-45 
13. Workers* Compensation *=»1950 
Compensation claim of worker, who 
had preexisting back problems and sus-
tained lower back injuries while stacking 
crates containing four to six gallons of 
milk, was remanded for further fact find-
ing on issue as to whether moving and 
ADDENDUM C~2 
ALLEN v INM 
t He *• W TJA 
lifunp several pile? of crates m'eighmg '&• 
to 50 pounds in confmea area of cooie* 
exceeded exeruon average person typical^ 
undertook in nonempiovmen! hit and 
whether there was medically demonstrable 
causal link between worker s action in lif: 
ing milK crates and injury to his back anc 
thus, ultimately, whether his injury "aros< 
out of or in tne course of employment' 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-4: 
Michael E. Bulson, Ogden, for plaintiff 
Gilbert Martinez, Salt Lake City, for Set 
ond Injun 
Fred R. Silvester. James R. Black, Salt 
Lake City, for State Ins. Fund 
DURHAM. Justice 
Claimant Robert A. Allen seeks a review 
from the Industrial Commission's denial of 
his motion for review of an administrative 
law judge order denying him compensatioi 
for a back injury sustained at work for 
the reasons stated beiou, we reverse and 
remand 
IIJ On November 23. 1982. the claim 
am, aged 36. was employed as night mar-
age r of Kent's Foods Tne claimant test! 
fled to the following version of events at a 
hearing before an administrative lav 
judge Tne claimant was working in a 
confined cooler in the store stacking crates 
containing four to six gallons * of milk 
from the floor onto a cooler shelf While 
lifting one crate to about chest level, he 
suddenly felt a Bharj pain m his lower 
back He immediately set down the crate 
and asked another employee to continue 
stocking the shelves Tnt claimant com 
pleted the one-half hour remaining in his 
shift doing desk work That night the pair, 
increased, and by morning his left leg feh 
numb Four or five days later, he saw Dr. 
Ivan Wright about his back problem In -
tia! doctor visits during December were 
followed through with the prescribed treat -
t. Vvr lake judicial notice that liquid milk weigh-
about the same as hquic water or approximate)) 
8/3 pounds pci gallon Tnus four gallons of 
milk weigh about 33 pounds witDom the con 
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men: of bea rest and medicatior. A myei-
gram finally revealeo a herniated disc anc. 
tne claimant spent ten days in traction 1: 
the hospital m eariy January He did no: 
return to won. 
Tne claimant also testified he had a hisv-
ry of prior back injuries- including a fa! 
fron; L telephoiv pon at age fourteer. 
which required him to wear a back brace 
for several montns. a back injury in 1977 
while lifung sand bags for the Logar, 
School District and another fall whiit 
working for that employer when he slipped 
on a slick concrete ramp and broke his 
coccyx. None of the pnor injunes resulted 
in prolonged absences from work 
The testimony from other sources varied 
slightly from the report given by the claim-
an: Tne employer s report of injury de 
scribes the accident as "picking up freight 
and stocking 11 on shelves, lifung boxes 
and stacking them from truck " No specif-
ic event was mentioned in the employer s 
report Tne medical records of treating 
physicians described the claimant's prev; 
ous injunes. but omitted any reference to a 
specific incident in the cooler. Dr. Hannar.. 
who examined the claimant on December 
31, 1982, wrote "He does not rememoer 
any distinct episoae as having precipitated 
his current problem, however.' And in a 
letter from Dr. bryner to Dr. Wright dated 
January 13. 198o. the claimant's history 
was related as follows "About six weeks 
ago. however, he was lifung matenal a: 
work, and recalls no .specific injury or 
•tress but developed discomfon in his left 
prom area which ultimately extended into 
his big tot ' 
Tne administrauve law judge found that 
the claimant s injury to his back on Novem-
ber 2c. 1982 was not "an injury by acci-
dent arising out of or in the course of 
employment" It is apparent that the ad 
tmnistrauve law judge, using a specific epi-
sode analysis, concluded there was no "ac-
cident** because there was no identifiable 
tamers and cratt Six gallon* of milk weigh 
approximately 50 pounds without the container* 
and crate 
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even; that caused tne injury and becaus* 
lifting the crates of mil* was a routine anc 
commonplace exeruon expected of the jot 
The administrative la* judge analogizec 
the facts of this case to Farmers Gran 
Cooperauvi v. Mason. 606 P.2d 237 (TJtar 
1980K where a gradually developed baa 
injury was held to bt no: compensable 
where the condition worsened without the 
intervention of any external occurrence or 
trauma 
Tne Bole issue on appeal is whether the 
claimant, who had suffered preexisting 
back problems and was injured as the re-
sult of an exertion usual and typical for hb 
job, was injured "by accident arising out of 
or in the course of employment' as re-
quired by the Workers' Compensation Act. 
U.C.A.. 1953. § 3^-1-45 (Supp.1986). That 
Act, in pertinent pan, provides 
Even* empioyet . . . who is injured . . . 
by accident arising out of or in the 
course of his employment . . . shall be 
paid compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury.... 
Id This statute creates two prerequisites 
for a finding of a compensable injury 
First, the injury must be "by accident * 
Second, the language "arising out of or u. 
tne course of employment' requires tha: 
there be a causai connecuon between the 
injury and tne employment Sec Pitts-
burgh Testing Laboratory t. Keller, 657 
P.2d 1367. 1370 (Utah, 1983, Prior dec* 
sions by this Court have often failed u> 
distinguish tne analysis of tn* accident 
question from tne discussion of causation 
elements 2 As a result, this Court and the 
Commission are faced with confusing and 
often inconsistent precedent. For this rea* 
2. Vve note that mam of our pnor opinions so 
intermingled the causation and accident analy-
ses ina' i< is impossible to segregate them and 
determine the basis lor the Courts decision 
For example, the opinion in Sabo's Eiec. Sen. \. 
Sabo, 642 ?2d 722 (Uian 1982;. mixes the acci 
dent and causation elements in the following 
language "it appears to be mere coincidence 
that defendant s miun . occurred at work 
Defendant bears the burden of showing other 
wist Proof of the causa! relationship of duties 
of employment to unexpected injury is simph 
lacking — (T)ne Commission s conclusion 
thai an accident occurred is without am sub 
son we now undertake a fresh look at the 
poncy and historical background of the 
worken compensation statute in an at-
tempt to provide a clear and workable ruk 
for future application by tne Commission 
1 
The term "by accident' is not defined in 
the worxers compensation statutes Tne 
most frequently referenced authority for 
the definition of "by accident" is the case 
of Carlinp i. Industrial Commission. 16 
Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965). where the 
term was defined as follows 
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated, 
unintended occurrence different from 
what would normally be expected to oc-
cur in tne usual course of events 
(TJhis is not necessarily restricted to 
some single incident which happened sud-
denly at one particular time and does not 
preclude the possibility' that due to exer-
tion, stress or other repetitive cause, h 
climax might be reached in such manner 
as to properly fall within the definition of 
an accident as just stated above. How-
ever, such an occurrence must be disun-
guished from gradually developing cond>-
tions which are classified as occupational 
diseases 
Id. at 261-62. 399 P.2d at 203 (citing Jones 
l California Packing Corp.. 121 Utah 
612. 616, 244 P.2d 640. 642 (1952). and 
Purity Biscuit Co. t. Industrial Commis-
sion. 115 Utah 1. 201 P.2d 961 (1949); 
Some confusion has developed as to wheth-
er "by acciaent' requires" proof of an un-
usual event This issue" frequently arises 
when tne employee suffers an internal fail-
ure 8 brought about by exertions in the 
stannve suppon in the record." Id at 726 (foot 
notes omitted) See also Church of Jesus Chns: 
of Latter-UQX Saints \. Industrial Commh. 590 
?2d 32fc. 32^-30 (Utah 1979;. hntar i. Industri-
al Comm n. 14 Utah 2d 276, 382 V26 414 (1963) 
For an example of an opinion which does tepa 
rate the accident and causation analysis, aee 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Industrial Comm n. 590 V2d 326. 330-31 (Utah 
1979) (Wilksns. J., dissenting). 
3. An "interna! failure" refers to a category of 
iniunes tha: arise h-om general organ or struc 
tural failure brought about b> an exertion in tht 
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workplace It is clear, however thai oir 
cases have defined "by accident' to incluat 
internal failures resulting from both usua 
and unusuai exeruons Sec Schmid: x 
Industrial Commission. 617 PJ&d 693, 69f 
fljtah 1980 
This Court first discussed the tern, "DV 
accident" in Tintic Milling Co. t. Industrt 
al Commission. 60 Utah 14. 200 P. 27> 
(1922). where an accident was aaid to be 
"something out of the ordinary. une> 
pected. and definitely located as to time 
and place/' 60 Utah at 22, 206 P. at 281 
This definition was used to distinguish inju-
ries which occurred gradually and were 
covered under statutory provisions for oc 
cupational disease Id The Court in Tin 
tic Milling also acknowledged that where 
the claimant suffers an internal failure the 
"unexpected result' rule of the seminal 
English case of Fenton v. Thorley, [1903] 
A.C. 443. 72 LJ.K. 789. 6 W.C.C. 1. is 
appropriate The Court in Tintic Milling 
observed 
"Since the case of Fenton t. Thorley. 
nothing more is required than that the 
harm that the plaintiff has sustained 
shall be unexpected It is enough 
that the causes, themselves known and 
usual, should produce a result which or 
a particular occasion is neither designed 
nor expected Tne test as to whether an 
injury is unexpected, ana so. if received 
on a single occasion, occurs 'by acciaent 
is that the sufferer die no; intend or 
expect that injury would on that paracu 
lar occasion result from what he was 
doing ' 
60 Utah at 26, 206 P. at 282 (quoting Boh-
leii, A Problem in Tht Drafting of Work-
men '$ Compensation Acts, 25 Harv.L.Rev 
826. 340 (1912) (emphasis added)) Accord-
ingly, the Court in Tintic affirmed a find-
ing that the employee, whose previous res-
piratory problems were aggravated by en-
tering a roasting flue, had suffered a com-
pensable accident 
workplace Internal failure claims evaluated b\ 
this Court include hean attacks hernias and 
back injuries See generally, Note. Schmidt i 
industrial Commission and Injury Compcnsabih 
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After Tintic Milling the Court term*.* 
raniy rejected the "unexpected result' def 
initios of Fenioii x Thorlei in interna 
failure cases on the ground that the def ID 
UOJ of "by accident' requireo an unusua 
occurrence or exertion In Bamberger ? 
Industrial Commission. 66 Utah 203, 24^  
P. 1103 (1925). the Court denieo compensa 
tioii to a worKer wno unexpectedly suf-
fered a heart attack while manually unload-
ing a raiiroaa car of coai on the ground 
that no overexertion occurred during the 
work 66 Utah at 208, 240 P. at 1104 
Tnat decision was apparently overruled, 
however, when the Court embraced the 
"unexpected result" rule and awarded com 
pensation to an employee who Buffered a 
heart attack after overexertions while rou-
tinely cleaning the weirs to a city reservoir 
Hammona i. Industrial Commission, 84 
Utah 67, 87, 34 P.2d 687, 695 (1934) (Mof-
fat. J., concurring) Hammond was fol-
lowed in Columbia Steel Co. i. Industrial 
Commission 92 Utah 72. 66 P.2d 124 
(1937). where a unanimous Court held that 
tne employee, who had suffered a ruptured 
aorta from riding a caterpillar tractor over 
rough ground, suffered an injury "by accr 
dent' since tne result wa»c "an unusual. 
unforeseen, and unexpected event or occur-
rence* and definite as to time and place. 
Id. at 92, 66 P.2d at 134. And. in Thomas 
D. Dec Memorial Hospital Ass n t. Indus-
trial Commission. 104 Utah 61. 138 P.2d 
233 (1943). tne Court sustained an award of 
benefits to a claimant who had suffered 
from hean disease and experienced a heart 
attack shortly after moving 62 boxes 
weighing 50 to 100 pounds and 28 sacks of 
fire ciay—work that was unusually heavy 
and greatly in excess of his ordinary 
duties Tne Court pointed out. in dicta, 
that the English common law would have 
awaroed compensation even if the exer-
tions were ordinary and usually required as 
part of the jot. 104 Utah at 67-71, 138 
P.2d at 235-3^ Quoting from the Bohlen 
article, supra, the Court observed: 
fv under Utah Worker's Compensation Law: A 
Just Result or Jus: Anothr "Living Corpse"/, 
1981 Utah LRev. 393 
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"fN)othinf more is required than tha: 
the harm that the plaintiff has sustainec 
shall be unexpected Tne element of 
unexpectedness inherent in the word 'ac-
cident' is sufficiently supplied . . . if. 
though the act K usual and the cond 
tions normal, it causes a harm unfore 
seen by him who suffers it' 
104 Utah at 70. 138 P.2d at 23T 
Six years later in Purity Biscuit Co t 
Industrial Commumon, 115 Utah 1. 201 
P.2d 961 (1949). this Court explicitly 
adopted the English rule for the definition 
of an accident and awarded benefits to a 
claimant who unexpectedly injured his back 
while stepping on the brake pedal of a 
delivery truck—a usual and ordinary activi 
ty. See 115 Utah 14-20, 201 P.2d 967-70. 
After summarizing early Utah eases inter-
preting "by accident" the Court concluded 
that ''since 1922 this court has uniformly 
held that an unexpected internal failure 
meets the requirements of ["by accident"] 
4. The holding of Punt? Biscuit was questioned 
in Mellen v. Industrial Comm n, 19 Utah 2d 373 
431 P.2d 798 (1967). where the opinion errone-
ously stated that Purity Biscuit "has never beer 
cited by this or any other court to support tht 
Uw of that case ' 19 Utah 2d at 375, 431 ?2d a 
799 In faa, by 1967 Punry Biscuit had beer 
relied upon in decisions from the courts of mnt 
other state*. Alabama Textiles Proas. Corp \ 
Grantham, 263 Ala 179. 183-*4. 82 So.2d 2(K 
208 (1955) (finding of unusual strain or exeruor 
unnecessary to support conclusion that claiman: 
suffered injury bv accident;, Bryant Stave 6. 
heading Co. v. White. 227 Ark 147, 151-52. 29t 
SMJZd 436. 439-40 (1956) (Punry Biscuit citec 
as stating majority DOSXUOD that usual exeruor 
causing an interna] failure may be by accident; 
Argonaut ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm n. 
231 Ca.LApp.2d 111. 41 CalJCptr. 628. 635 (1964) 
(reiving upon causation rule of Purity Biscuit) 
Sptvey v. Banaglw PruxtCo., 138 So2d 308. 31* 
(Fia.1962) (back herniation from rupture of m 
tervenebrai disc satisfies statutory requiremen: 
of suddenness;. Roman v. Minneapolis Si /?>., 
268 Minn. 367, 380. 129 NW.2d 550. 559 (1964; 
(calls Punry Biscuit *a weh-considered work 
mens compensation cast" thai supported mr. 
award wnere mam factors led to the disability) 
Murph\ \. Anaconda Cc 133 Mom. 198. 208. 
321 ?26 1094. 1100 (1958) (quoting favorabh 
the reliance on Punry Ikscuit in Bryant Stave 
227 Ar* at 151-52, 296 S.W2d at 439-40, and 
holding that a usuai exertion may lead to a 
compensable injury where the causal relation 
ship is established;, Neman v. Ford Motor Co.. 
10 KJ. 325. 327-28. 9) A2d 569, 570 (1952) (Pu 
and the legislature by failing to amend hac 
acquiesced in tnat construction ' 115 Utah 
at 16. 201 P.2d at 96c. 
Tnfr holding of Purity Biscuit also 
squarely embraced the concept that an or 
dinars or usual exertion that results m ar: 
unexpected injury is compensable. See l lo 
Utah at 18-19. 201 P. at 86&-70. After 
carefully considering the legislative pur-
pose of tne workers' compensation statute. 
prior precedent, and public policy, the 
Court rejected the requirement that proof 
of an unusual activity or exertion be a 
required element of the "by accident*' defi-
nition. 115 Utah at 14-20, 201 P.2d at 
967-70 The Court concluded that "there 
is nothing in the statute which would justi-
fy a holding that an injury is compensable 
where overexertion is shown but is not 
compensable where only ordinary exertion 
is shown, provided that in both cases it is 
shown that the exertion causes the inju-
ry" 4 115 Utah at 19, 201 P.2d at 970. 
riry Biscuit cited in support of rule that interna! 
failure from ordinary or usual exertion is an 
"injury bv accident"); Olson v. Suite Indus: 
Accident Comm'n, 222 Or. 407. 416-17, 352 ?2d 
1096, 1101 (1960) (OConnell. J., specially con 
curnng) (dissent to Punry Biscuit quoted; Coo 
per v. Vinaneru 73 S.D. 41*. 424. 43 N.W.2d 747. 
750-51 (1950) (Punry Biscuit cued as an exam 
pit of the divergent viewpoints for defining a 
compensable accident 
In addition, the decision in Punry Biscuit was 
relied upon by the majority in three Utah cases. 
See Jones \ California Packing Co., 121 Utah 
612 244 V2d 640. 642, Carlmg i. Industrial 
Commission. 16 Utah 2d 260. 399 ?2d 202, 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 
140, 427 ?2d 740 Desfrhe* This support for the 
decision in Punry Biscuit, the Court in Melier. 
concluded without further discussion that 1t)he 
Purity Biscuit decision certainly needs a health) 
reappraisemen: * 19 Utah 2d at 376, 431 T2d at 
BOO 7 wo years later in kedman Warehousing 
Corp v. Industrial Comm n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 
T2d 263 (1969;, the Court again questioned the 
Punry Biscuit decision in a superficial analysis 
tha* concluded Turin emoys the unique and 
doubtful distinction of beuif a living corpse' 
22 Utah 2c at 403. 454 V2d at 2&t After 
considering those cases from Utah and other 
jurisdictions that have relied on Punty Biscui:. 
we nou canno: agree that it was a "living 
corpse." Moreover, even if Purity Biscuit lay 
dormant, it was resurrected by Schmidt v. In-
dustrial Commission, 617 ?2d 693. 695 (Utah 
1980) 
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Since Purity Biscuit, numerous case-
have held that an internal injury may b* 
compensable if n results from either a 
usua) or unusual exertion in the course of 
employment Sec. e.g.. Champion horra 
Builden x. Industrial Commission. 70; 
P.2d 30G (Utah 1985) (perforated uicer 
caused by lifting an unusually heavy 
beam). Pittsburg Testing Laboratories \ 
Keller. 657 P.2d at 1367 (unforeseen anc 
unanticipated heart attack resulting from 
exeruon whiie inspecting roof atructure) 
Kaiser Steel Corp r. Monfredu 631 P.2d 
888 (Utah 1981) (back injury resulting from 
shoveling coal compensable despite usual 
ness of activity and presence of preexisting 
conditions): Painter Motor t. Ostler. 617 
P.2d 975 (Utah 1980) (back injury resulting 
from moving heavy boxes and installing 
electrical equipment); Schmidt v. Industri-
al Commission. 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980> 
(back injury resulting from carrying steel 
plates compensable despite prior history of 
back disorders and ordinary activity; 
United States Steel Corp. v. Draper. 61 o 
P.2d 508 (Utah 1980) (heart attack result 
ing from exertion while rushing to drown-
ing accident;: JGA Food Fan r. Martin 
584 P.2d 828 (Utah 1978) (heart attack re 
suiting from heavy lifting), hiuzum v. Roo 
sendahl Construction d* Mining Corp.. 
565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977) (truck driver 
suffered heart attack after repeatediy 
climbing long steps;; Residential & Com-
mercial Construction Co t. Industrial 
Commission. 52^ P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) 
(back injury resulting from moving lum-
ber;. Powers i. Industrial Commission 
19 Utah 2d 140. 427 P.2d 740 (1967) (heart 
distress occurring over a period of several 
montns- compensable despite preexisting 
conditions): baker v. Industrial Commis-
sion. 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965^ 
(back injury* resulting from filing papers in 
lower drawer compensable). 
Despite the strong precedential support 
for applying the 'unexpected result' rule 
of Purity Biscuit to internal failure cases, 
a separate line of opposing authonn has 
developed which requires overexertion or 
an unusual event tt» prove an injury oc 
curred "by accident" Typically, these 
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case*- oenieo compensator< because the 
claimants ordinary work duties precipitai 
ed the injury Consequently, there were TK 
events or exertion? tnat were unusual or 
extraordinary to qualify a* "oy accident' 
Set. e.g.. Bilimgs Computer Corp v. Jar 
ango. 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983) (compensa-
tion for knee injury denied wnere circum 
stances precipitating the injury were con 
monplace anc usual) Sabo's Electronic 
Service t. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982. 
(back injury- from loading box of twelve 
radios into van not compensable): Farrrt 
er's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 
237 (Utah 1980) (back injury to claimant 
with preexisting condition resulting from 
delivery of 100-pound sacks not compensa-
ble Bince the activity was not unusual or 
unexpected): Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commis-
sion 590 P.2d 326 (Utah 1979) (back injury 
suffered by janitor upon standing up no; 
compensable without evidence that activi-
ties were unusual); Redman Warehousing 
Corp. v. Industrial Commission 22 Utah 
2d 396. 454 P.2d 283 (1969) (back injury 
precipitated by sitting and driving a mov-
ing van not compensable without proof of 
an unusual event) These cases will not be 
collectively referred to as the Redman line 
of cases 
12) We are now convinced that the Red-
man line of cases has misconstrued the 
historical and logical definition of "by acci-
dent " Tne Redman line of cases relied on 
the following abridged version of the defi 
nition of an acciaent found ir. Carling x 
Industrial Commission "[Accident] con-
notes an unanticipated, unintended occur-
rence different from what would normal-
ly bt expected to occur m the usua! 
course of events" 16 Utah at 261, 39^ 
P.2d at 20o (emphasis added; footnotes 
omitted) In Redman, the highlighted 
phrase was interpreted tc require an un-
usual event before there can be an acci-
dent This interpretation misconstrues the 
Carling decision itself and is inconsistent 
with the English definition of "by accident" 
used by this Court since 1922 The key 
requirement of an accident under the Car 
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/trap decision as wel a* prior decision* 
was that tne occurrence be unanticipated 
unplanned ana umniendec The highhgm 
ed phrase emphasized that where eitner tn< 
cause of the injury or tne result of ar 
exertion was different from what woulc 
normally be expecteo to occur, the occur 
rence was unplanned, unforeseen. unin 
tended and tnerefore "DV acciden:* 
Policy considerations also militate in fa 
vor of rejecting the notion that the pnrase 
"by accident' requires an unusual even: 
There is nothing in the term "accident' 
that suggests that only that which is un 
usual is accidental. Sec Robertson v. In-
dustrial Commission. 109 Utah at 33. 40 
163 P.2d at 335. 338 (Wade, J., concurring; 
Wolfe. J., dissenting! An accident does 
not occur simply because a worker is in-
jured during an unusual activin*. This ar-
gument is illustrated by Professor Laraoi> 
in his treatise on workmen's compensation 
with the following example 
If an employee intentionally and know-
ingly undertakes to lift an unusual load, 
the cause (i.e.. the lifting) is no more 
accidental than if he deliberately lifted a 
normal load Or if a gardener deliberate-
ly continues to mow the lawn in the ran. 
a passerby observing him would not say 
that he was undergoing an accident 
merely because it * unusual to mov 
lawns in tne rain 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation $ 38 -
62, at 7-162 (1986) (footnotes omitted i 
Larson also criticizes the usual-unusua 
distinction as being unworkable in practice 
Realistically, it is impossible to determine 
what are the usual and norma! require 
ments of a job. People work in good 
weather and bad, lift heavy items as well 
as light ones, and work for long hours as 
wel! as short ones None of these activi-
ties may be unusual or unexpected. Id. 
§ 88.63 at 7-164 to -16L 
The unworkability of the usual-unusual 
€vent requirement is further evidenced by 
comparing seemingly irreconcilable deci-
sions by this Court Compare Kaiser 
Steel t. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (back inju-
ry to miner with previous back problems 
helo to be a compensable accident despiu 
beinf caused by snoveling coal in the usual 
course- of employment), with Farmer* 
Gram Cooperative t. Mason. 606 P.2d 237 
(no accident wnere worker witn previous 
back problems sustained back injury while 
delivering 100-pound bags of whey;, com-
pare Baker i. Industrial Commission, 17 
Utah 2d 141. 405 P.2d 613 (compensable 
accident for back injury resulting from fil-
ing paper in lower drawer; with Billings 
Computer Corp. t. Tarango. 674 P.2d 104 
mo accident where worker sustained knee 
injury resulting from bending to pick up 
small parts) 
13,4] We bebeve that the Courts real 
concern in the Redman line of cases was 
the presence or absence of proof of causa-
tion to support an award of compensation. 
See generally Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints. 590 P.2d at 332 (Wil-
kins, J., dissenting). As will be discussed 
in the next section, the Conn has developed 
two parallel lines of authority on the causa-
tion issue, one of which requires an un-
usual event in order to meet the statutory 
causation requirement Although proof of 
an unusual event may be helpful in deter-
mining causation, it is no; required as an 
element of "oy accident' in section 35-1-
45 "[Tjne basic and indispensable ingredi-
ent of acciden: is unexpectedness" 
Schmidt 617 P.2o at 696 (Wilkins. J., con-
curring » (quoting IB Larson. Workmen'$ 
Compensation, at 7-5 (1980). We there-
fore reaffirm those cases, which hold that 
an accioent is an unexpected or unintended 
occurrence that may be either the cause or 
the result of an injury. We thus necessar-
ily abandon the analysis of "by accident" in 
the Redman line of cases which predicates 
the "accident" determination upon the oc-
currence of an unusual even; 
II 
The second element of a compensable 
accident requires proof of a causal connec-
tion between the injury and the worker s 
employment duties. Pittsburg Testing 
Laboratory t. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 1370 
(Utah 1983) In workers' compensation 
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cases involving internal failures, tne Ke> 
issue is usually one of causation. Ordmar 
h. causation is proved by tne producuor 
and interpretation of medical evidence e 
ther alone or together witn other evidenct 
See Keller. 657 P.2c a; 13GT. 1370 
Schmidt i. Industrial Commission. 61T 
P.2d 693. 695 (Utah 1980) because of the 
difficulties of diagnos* of internal failures 
and because of tne possibility that a preex-
isting condition may have contributed u 
the injury, special causation rules have 
been developed for internal failure cases 
See Larson, supra. § 38.81, at 7-269, Pu-
rity Biscuit Co i. Industrial Commu 
sion. 115 Utah 1. 20-21, 201 P.2d 970-71 
(Wolfe. J., concurring specially) 
This Court initially responded to the 
problem of causauon in internal failure 
cases by suggesting that the Commission 
use a clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard when an internal failure was caused 
by an exeroon in tne workplace.5 Se( 
Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass n 
t. Industrial Commission. 104 Utah 61. 
74. 138 P.2d 233. 238 (1943) The clear and 
convincing evidence standard was rejected 
however, in Lipman i. Industrial Com-
mission. 592 P.2d 61C. 618 (Utah 1979; 
with the rationale that such a standard 
would make workers compensation bene-
fits nearly impossible to recover where the 
deceased suffered froze a preexisting cond> 
tion Accordingly, the standard to prove 
causa! connection is preponderance of the 
evidence Id 
Tne second method that has been used to 
ensure causal connection in internal failure 
cases is to require proof that an unusual 
even; or activity precipitated the injury. 
Presumably, this requirement was used to 
prevent compensating a person predisposed 
to internal failure where the preexisting 
condition contributed more u> the injury 
than his usual work activity. Tne follow-
ing internal failure cases illustrate that evi-
dence of an unusual event or activity is 
necessan to prove causation. Billings 
5. In Nebraska, an enhanced standard of proof is 
still used where the employee cufiers from a 
preexisting condition Set Mann v. City o* 
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Cojrivuter Con r Taranpo 674 P.2d 10; 
lOf^ OT (Utah 1983). Sabo's Electronic Sc> 
incr v. Sabo. 642 P.2d 722. 726 n 12 (Utar 
1982): Cnurch of Jesus Christ of Latter, 
bav Saint* x Industrial Commission* 
590 P.2d 328. 329 (Utah 1979; 1GA Fooc 
Fair t. Martin. 584 P.2d 82b. 821J (Utar 
1978; Suzum i. koosendeh! Construe 
tion & Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144. 114f 
(Utah 1977). Jones i California Packing 
Corp.. 121 Utah 612. 244 P.2d 640 (1952) 
Robertson r. Industrial Commission, 109 
Utah 25. 163 P.2d 331 (1945); Thomas D 
Dee Memorial hospital Assn v. Industri-
al Commission. 104 Utah 61. 138 P.2d at 
23^; sec Schmidt. 617 P.2d at 697-99 
(Crockett. J., dissenting); Farmer's Grain 
Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237, 238-
39 (Utah 1980); Mellen i\ Industrial Com-
mission. 19 Utah 2d 373, 374, 431 P.2d 798. 
799 (1967); Purity Biscuit 115 Utah at 30, 
201 P.2d at 975 (Latimer, J., dissenting) 
Defendants argue that any rule that 
awards compensation based on usual exer-
tion will open the floodgates for payment 
of benefits for all internal injuries that 
coincidentally occur at work. Tney claim 
that the unusual exertion requirement is 
necessan to prevent tne employer from 
becoming a general insurer. Tney argue 
that without the unusual exertion rule, em-
ployment opportunities for persons with a 
history or indication of physical disability 
or handicap will be reduced 
Despite precedent supporting the "un-
usual exertion* rule, the claimant urges us 
to follow a separate hitet>f authority that 
awards compensation for injuries that oc-
cur during usual and ordinary workplace 
activin. Tfiese cases typically award com-
pensation where the claimant was engaged 
in a workplace activity and where there is 
adequate evidence of medical causation 
Sec, e.g.. Kaiser Steel Corp. t. Monfredi. 
631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981) (award for com 
pensation affirmed for a coal miner's back 
injury despite absence of unusual incident); 
Schmidt t. Industrial Commission. 617 
P.2d at 695 (compensation awarded for 
Ornate. 211 Neb 583, 592. 319 K.W^d 454. 45* 
(1982; 
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If then is some personal causal contr. 
bution in the form of a [preexisting coi 
ditionj. tne employment contributor 
must take the form of an exertion grea*. 
er tnan that of nonempioyment lift 
If tnere is no personal causai contrite-
tion. thai is. if tnere is no pnor weaKnes.^  
or disease, any exertion connected witr 
the employment and causally connected 
with the (injury) as a matter of medical 
fact is adequate to satisfy the legal tes; 
of causatior 
Id Tnus. where the claimant suffers from 
a preexisting condition which contributes to 
the injury, an unusual or extraordinary e> 
ertion is required to prove legal causatior 
Wnere there is no preejosting condition, a 
usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient.* 
19) We also accept Larsons suggestion 
that the comparison between the usual and 
unusual exertion be defined according to ar. 
objective standard "Note that the com-
parison is not with this employee's usua! 
exertion in his employment but with the 
exertions of normal nonempioyment life of 
this or any other person '* Larson, supra 
§ 88.83(b). at 7-279 (emphasis in original/ 
Sec also Johns-Manvillc Products x. fa 
dustnal Commission. 78 IU.2d 171, 17fe. 3; 
lll.Dec. 540. 544. 399 N.E2d 606, 610 (1979 
(compensation denied where tne risk of the 
employment activity "is DO greater thar. 
that to which he would have been exposed 
had he not been so employed*'), Strickland 
S. Larson highlights the difference between the 
unusual-usuai exertion lesi with the rule wr 
tooa\ adopt with the following examples of e> 
ire me cases in the bean attack area 
Suppose X s job involves frequent lifting of 
200-pound bags, and one such 20u-pound lih 
medicaliv produces a hean attaci. Under the 
old unusuai-exertion rule tnere would be no 
compensation regardless of previous hean 
condition Under tnt suggested rule there 
would be compensation, even in the presence 
of a history of hean diseast. because peopit 
general)) do not lift 200-pounc weights as & 
pan of nonemplovment lot and therefore 
this episode cannot be ascribed to the ord» 
nan wear and tear of life 
Suppose Y s job involves no lifting Sup-
pose he lifts a 20-pound weight on the job 
and suppose there is medical testimony tha: 
this lih caused his hean attack Under the 
old tesi. exclusive)) concerned with the com 
r. Aatwna! Gypsun, Co.. 34£ So.2d 497 
499 (Ala Civ.App. 1977; (employment rist 
must i* " a danger or risk materially u 
excess of tnat to which people not so em-
ployeo are exposed... '' Quoting iron 
City of Tuscaloosa t. Howard. 55 Ala.Ap^ 
701. 70;>-0C, 318 So.2d 729. 732 (1975)) 
but sec Market Foods Distributors. Inc. i 
Lcvenson. 383 So.2d 12i>. 727 (Fla.Dist.Ct. 
App.1980/ (subjective test "the employ 
ment must involve an exertion greater than 
that normally performed by the employee 
during his non-employment life"). Tnus. 
the precipitating exertion must be com 
pared with the usua) wear and tear and 
exertions of nonempioyment life, not the 
nonempioyment life of the particular work-
er 
We believe an objective standard of com-
parison wili provide a more consistent and 
predictable standard for the Commission 
and this Court to follow. In evaluating 
typical nonempioyment activity, the focus 
is on what typical nonempioyment activities 
are generally expected of people in today's 
society, not what this particular claimant is 
accustomed to doing. Typical activities 
ana exertions expected of men and women 
in the latter part of the 20th century, for 
exampie. include taking full garbage cans 
to the street, lifting and carrying baggage 
for travel changing a flat tire on an auto-
mobile, lifting a small chUd to chest height, 
and climbing tne stairs in buildings By 
panson between this employee's usual exer-
tions and the precipiiaiing exertion, there 
would bt compensation. Under the suggested 
rule tne result would depend on whether 
there was a persona) causal element in the 
form of a previously weakened bean If 
there was noi, compensation would be award 
ed. since the employment contributed some 
thing and tne employee s persona) life nothing 
to the cause of the coliapst If there was (a 
previous)) weakened heart], compensation 
would be denied in spite of the medical causa1 
contribution because legally the persona! 
causal contribution was substantial, while the 
employment added nothing to the usual wear 
and tear of life—which certainly includes lift 
ing objects weighing 20 pounds such as bags 
of golf clubs, minnow pails, and step ladders 
Larson suprL. § 38.83. at 7-280-81 (footnote 
omitted; 
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sufficient causal connection between UH 
disability and the working conditions Tnf 
causauon requirement makes it necessan 
to distinguish those injuries which (a) coir 
cidentaliy occur at work because a preexist 
ing condition results in symptoms which 
appear during work hours without any en-
hancement from the workplace, and (b) 
those injuries which occur because some 
condition or exertion required by the em 
ployment increases the risk of injury which 
the worker normally faces in his everyday 
life. See Bryant v. Masters Machine Co.. 
444 A.2d 329, 837 (Me.1982) Only the 
latter type of injury is compensable under 
U.C.A., 1953, $ 35-1-45. There is no fixed 
formula by which the causation issue may 
be resolved, and the issue must be deter-
mined on the facts of each case 
[7] Professor Larson has suggested a 
two-part causation test which is consistent 
with the purpose of our workers' compen-
sation laws and helpful in determining cau-
sation We therefore adopt that test. Lar-
son suggests that compensable injuries can 
best be identified by first considering the 
legal cause of the injury and then its medV 
cal cause Larson, supra, { 38.83(a), at 
7-27o "Under the legal test, the law must 
define what kind of exertion satisfies the 
test of * arising out of the employment . . . 
(then) the doctors must say whether the 
exertion (having been held legally stiff* 
cient u> support compensation t in fact 
7. Cases from other jurisdiction* which have ac 
cepted the dual-causation standard augpested b> 
Larson include Market hoods Lhstrwi. inc \ 
Levenson, 383 So.2d 726 (Fla.DisLCXApp.1980' 
(claimant wirn preexisting spina] disease denied 
compensation wnert injury could have beer 
tnggereo ai any ume during norma] movement 
ano exertion m work not greater than typical 
nonempiovmen: exertion;, Ouuiry v. SUne In 
dus Potmen, Inc.. 41* So.2d 626 (La. 1982* 
(claimant grantee compensation where injurs 
resulted from stress, exertion, and strain greater 
than that tn evervda\ noneroplovment life; 
Bryant v. Masters Mack Co., 444 >L2d 329 (Mi 
1982) (claimant with preexisting condition 
swarded compensation for back injury resulting 
from fall from his stoo) at work because of 
increased risk of falling where employees 
moved around him at work); Barren v. Herbert 
Engi. ^c, 371 A.2d 633 (Me.1977; (daiman< 
with preexisting back condition denied compel/ 
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caused this [injury]" 
§ 3fc.83ta>. at 7-276 to -27T 
Utah 25 
Larson, suprc 
\%) 1 Legal Cause—Whether an inju 
ry arose out of or in the course of employ 
inent is difficult to determine where the 
employee brings to the workplace a person 
al element of risk such as a preexisting 
condition. Just because a person suffers a 
preexisting condition, be or she is not du* 
qualified from obtaining compensation 
Our cases make clear that "the aggrava-
tion or lighting up of a pre-existing disease 
by an industrial accident is compensa-
ble '" Powers t\ Industrial Commxs-
tion. 19 Utah 2d 140. 143-44, 427 P.2d 740, 
743 (1967) (footnote omitted). To meet the 
legal causation requirement, a claimant 
with a preexisting condition must show 
that the employment contributed some 
thing substantial to increase the risk he 
already faced in everyday life because of 
his condition This additional element of 
risk in the workplace is usually supplied by 
an exertion greater than that undertaken in 
normal, everyday life. This extra exertion 
serves to offset the preexisting condiuon of 
the employee as a likely cause of the inju-
ry, thereby eliminating claims for impair-
ments resulting from a personal risk rather 
than exertions at work Larson, supra, 
§ 88.83(b), at 7-278. Larson summarized 
how the legal cause rule would work in 
practice as follows: 
sation for injury resulting from working at nor 
mal pan since there was no work-related en 
hancemem of personaJ nsk). Mann \ City of 
Omaha. 211 Neb 583. 319 N Vs^d 454 (1982) 
(policeman with history of heart disease award 
ec compensation for heart attack at borne 
where claimant s physician testified that attack 
was caused by stress of police work rather than 
persona! risk factors). Sehens v. Alien Prods 
Cc. 206 Neb 50t. 293 N.W.2d 415 (1980 
(claimant with preexisting bean problems de 
Died compensation for bean attack suffered 
while unloading 28-pound case* from truck 
trailer despite sedentary nonworkmg lifestyle 
usinf objective standard of average worker in 
nonemplovment life); Couture \ Mammoth 
Groceries ' Inc., 116 N.H 181. 355 K2d 421 
(1976) (claimant with no preexisting bean prob-
lems awarded benefits upon proof that lifting 
beef medicali> caused the fatal bean attack) 
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back injuries arising frorr, ordinan duties 
upon proof of mecbcal causal connection, 
between workplace exertions and the iniu 
ryy. Residential and Commercial Cov 
struction Co i. Industrial Commission 
529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) (carpenter's back 
injury from lifting, bending, and twisting n 
the ordinary course of work compensable) 
Power* x Industrial Commissioii 19 
Utah 2d 140. 427 P.2d 740, 742 (1967) 
(awarding compensation to fireman for ex 
ertions in the normal course of employ-
ment—the Court rejecting tne unusual ex 
ertion test in favor of ordinan exertion; 
Baker t. Industrial Commission. 17 Utah 
2d 141. 405 P.2d 613 (1965) (back injury 
from filing papers in lower drawer of cabi-
net compensable): Purity Biscuit Co r. 
Industrial Commission. 115 Utah 1. 201 
P.2d 961 (1949) Although the usual exer-
tion rule was questioned in Me lien i. In 
dustrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d at 31b-
76, 431 P.2d at 800, that decision failed to 
explicitly overrule the usual exertion line of 
cases Moreover, Residential and Com 
mercial Construction Co.. Schmidt, and 
Kaiser Steel have awarded compensator 
for usual workplace activity after the Mel 
lev decision Clearly, the usual exertior 
rule is no: simph an aberration in Utah 
la* 
When read in chronological sequence, 
our opinions demonstrate an inconsistent 
and confused approach to determining 
when an accident arose out of or in the 
course of employment Much of this con 
fusion can be traced to fundamental proU 
lems stemming from the use of the usual 
unusual distinction as a means of proving 
causation Larson criticizes the unusual 
exertion requirement by itself as a "clumsy 
and ill-fitting device with which to ensure 
causal connection/' Larson, supra, § 8fc-
81, at 7-270. The problems in determining 
what activities were usual or unusual were 
6. Larson s observation is consistent with this 
Court k rationale for rejecting the unusual exer 
tion requirement in Purity Bisctui, 115 Utah a; 
16. 20] P.2d at 968 
|I)f (overexertion) is the test no one will ever 
know what thjs court will consider sufticien'. 
overexertion Also under thai test if the work 
recognized a.c long ago as 1949 when Jus 
tice Wolf(j wrou tnat a "Pandora's box of 
difficulties . . may be opened by the re 
fmements between usual ana unusual. e>. 
ertion ana overexertion, ordinary and e> 
traordman exertion measured by the indi-
vidual mvoivea or by the inaustna) func-
tion periormed by hmi or both ' Punti 
Biscuit. 115 Utah at 23. 201 P.2d at 97^ 
(Wolfe, J- concurring speciallyj Tne coir 
tents of the Pandoras box feared by Jus-
tice Wolfe are now evident in the plethora 
of our cases struggling with a defmiuon of 
a compensable accident based upon the 
usualness or ordinariness of an activity. 
Professor Larson has also criticized the 
usual-unusual distinction because the ord> 
nanness of the activity fails to consider 
that some occupations routinely require a 
usual exertion capable of causing injury. 
Likewise, other occupations, such as desk* 
work, require BO little physical effort that 
an "unusual exertion* may be insufficient 
to prove that the resulung accident arose 
out of the employment Larson, supra, 
§ 38.81, at 7-270f' 
15] Because we find the present use of 
the usual-unusual distinction unhelpful and 
our prior precedent inconsistent, we take 
this opportunity to examine an alternative 
causation analysis that may better meet 
the objectives of the workers compensa-
tion laws We are mindful that the key 
question in determining causation is wheth-
er, given this body and this exeruon. the 
exertion in fact contributed to. the injury. 
Id § 38.82. at 7-271;- Purity biscuit 115 
Utah at 23. 201 P.2d at 972 (Wolfe. J., 
concurring specially). 
(6) The language "arising out of or in 
the course of his employment" found in 
U.C.A.. 1953. { 85-1-45 '(Supp.1986), was 
apparently intended to ensure that compen-
sation is only awarded where there is a 
usually required by the job is so great that ii 
would break the strongest man even he will 
not be able lo recover But if it is more lhar. 
usual exeruor, which causes the injury the 
employee can recover no matter how Ughi the 
work is which causes the injury 
id 
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usinf an objective standard the case lav 
will eventually define a standard for typical 
''nonemployment activity" in much the wa;. 
case law has developed the standard of 
care for the reasonable man in tort lav. 
f 10] 2 Medico! Cause—Tt* seconc 
part of Larson s dual-causation test re 
quires that the claimant prove the disability 
is medically the result of an exertion or 
injury that occurred during a work-related 
activity Tne purpose of the medical cause 
test is to ensure that there is a medicaliy 
demonstrable causal link between the 
work-related exertions and the unexpected 
injuries that resulted from those strains 
The medica) causa! requirement will pre 
vent an employer from becoming a genera! 
insurer of his employees and discourage 
fraudulent claims 
With the issue being one primarily of 
causation, the importance of the . . . 
medical panel becomes manifest. It is 
through the expertise of the medical par-
el that the Commission should be able tc 
make the determination of whether tin 
injury sustained by a claimant K causal)} 
connected or contributed to by the claim 
ant's employment 
Schmidt. 617 P.2d at 697 (Wilkins. J., con-
curring) Under tne medical cause test, the 
claimant must show by evidence, opinion. 
or otherwise that tne stress, strain, or exer 
tion required by his or her occupation led u 
the resulting injury or disability In tm 
event the claimant cannot show * medica1 
causal connection, compensation should be 
denied/ 
III 
111] We now undertake to apply the 
foregoing analysis to the case before us 
In reviewing findings of fact of the Indus 
trial Commission, we determine whether 
there is substantia) evidence to support the 
Commissions findings Champion Home 
9. Evidence of the ordinariness or usualness o' 
the employee s exertions may be relevant to the 
medica) conclusion of causa) connection 
Where the injury results from latent symptoms 
with an illness such as bean disease, proof of 
medical causation may be especially difficult 
Larson s treatise cites many examples of cases 
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buildcn ? Industnn1 Commission 7(K 
P.2d 30(i. 307 (l tab 1985 
112] We nave previously stated that th< 
key element of whetner an injury occurred 
"oy accident' is whether the injury wai 
unexpectec After reviewing the recorc 
we find no substantial eviaence that th< 
injury was not unexpected It is c)ea~ 
from the uncontradicted testimony of the 
claimant that he expenencea an unexpectec 
and unanticipated injury to his back as he 
lifted a crate of milk in the cramped area of 
the cooler. Although the claimant had in 
jured his back on prior jobs, he had not 
complained of pain or limitations at his job 
with Kent's Foodx Tnere is no evidence 
which indicates that this injury was predict-
able or that it developed gradually as with 
an occupational disease or progressive back 
disorder. While the employer s report of 
injury and the medical records do not cor-
roborate that a sudden and identifiable in-
jury occurred in the cooler, the reports are 
unhelpful in determining whether the inju-
ry was unexpectec 
It appears that the administrative lav 
judge applied the ''unusual event or trau-
ma' rule in defining an accident We have 
rejected that test in lieu of a test based on 
unexpecteaness Moreover, the adminis-
trative law judge s emphasis on pnor inju-
ries is not determinative of whether an 
accident occurred We have previously 
held that the aggravation or "lighting up' 
of a preexisting condition by an internal 
failure is a compensable accident Powers 
t. Industrial Commi&sxoiu., 19 Utah 2d 140, 
143. 427 P.2d 740. 743 (19C7) We conclude 
therefore tnat the decision of the Commis-
sion that the claimants injury was not "by 
accident' was not based on trie evidence, 
and thai decision is. therefore erroneous 
113] Tne key issue in this case, like 
most interna) failure cases, is whether the 
injury "arose out of or in the course of 
where compensation claim* were defeated bt 
cause of inadequate proof of medica) causauor. 
See Larson, suprc, § 38.83(i), at 7-319 to -321 
Compare Guidr\ v. Slme Indus Painters, inc., 
418 So^d 626 (La 1982) (heart attack triggered 
by stresy exertion and strain greater than sec 
eniary life of averagt worker compensable;. 
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employment " Since the claimant had pre 
vious back problems, to meet the legal cab 
sauon requirement ne must show thai mo\ 
ing and lifting several piies of dairy proo 
ucts weighing thiny to fifty pounas in tn* 
confmea area of tnt cooler exceeded tn-
exertion tnat tne average person typicali> 
undertakes in nonempioyment life The e^  
idence presented by tne claimant was msuf 
ficient for us to make a determination re-
garding legal causauon It is unclear from 
the record how many crates were moved by 
the claimant, the distance the crates were 
moved, the precise freight of the crates, 
and the size of the area m which the lifung 
and moving took place Because the claim 
ant did not have the benefit of the fore 
going opinion, we remand for further fact 
finding on this issut 
Moreover, the record is insufficient to 
show medical causauon It is unclear from 
the medical reports whether the doctors 
were aware of tne specific incident in the 
cooler Further, the case was not sub-
mitted to a medical panel for its evaluation 
Without sufficient evidence of medical cau 
aauon. we are unable to determine whether 
there is a medically demonstrable causal 
link between the lift in the cooier and the 
injury to the claimant's back We there 
fore remand to the Industrial Commission 
for addiuonai evidence and findmgb on the 
question of medical causation 
Tne decision of the Commission is vacat-
ed and remanded 
HOWE and ZIMMERMAN. JJ., concur 
HALL, Chief Justice: (concurring and 
dissenting). 
I concur in remanding this case to the 
Commission for the purpose of determining 
1. Powers v. Industrial Commn. 19 Utah 2d 140, 
M>-44, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967). 
2. 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). 
3. Emery Mining Corp \. DeFnez 694 P.2d tOt 
(Utah 1984;, Giles v. Indusmal Commn, 692 
P.2d 743 (Utah 1984). fnto-Lay. Inc. v. Jacobs, 
680 p.2d 1335 (Utah 1984;. Billings Computer 
Corp i Jarango. 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1963; 
Sabos Elec Sen v Sabc 642 V26 722 (Utah 
1982;, Kaiser Steel x. Monfred:. 631 P.2d S8f 
(Utah 1981;; Farmer's Gram Cooperative v. Mo 
whether tne work incident aggravated a 
preexisting condition such as would war 
rant an award of compensation .' However 
1 bo not join the Court in adopting ar, 
* unexpectea result"" standard to be applied 
in determining tne existence of a compensa 
b)e acciaen: 
1 do not beheve that this Court has ^mis-
construed the historical and logical" defini-
tion of "by accident' in the bulk of iu 
recent cases concerning the issue at bar. 
Tne majority's reliance upon Purity Bis-
cuit Co t. Industrial Commission2 is 
misplaced The holding therein is without 
precedential value because it has been sim-
piy ignored 3 Tne only case in which this 
Court followed Purity Biscuit is Schmidt 
v. Industrial Commission.4 which support 
is similarly without precedential value be 
cause it has also been ignored beginning 
with Painter Motor Co. v. Ostler} the very 
next accident case handed down. In that 
case, the Court cited and relied upon Car-
ling v. Industrial Commission 4 and again 
defined "accident* as an unanticipated, 
unintended occurrence different from what 
would normally be expected to occur in the 
usual course of events In my view. Puri-
ty Biscuit and Schmidt emerge as aberra-
tions in our postwar case law. 
Tne majority opinion holds that hence-
forth an injury by accident "is an unex-
pected or unintended occurrence that may 
be either the cause or the re*nh of an 
injury." (Emphasis urorigmal.) However, 
the legislature, whose prerogative it is to 
establish policy, has chosen wording which 
precludes such an interpretation. The rea 
sonmg of Justice Latimer's dissent in Puri-
son 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 1980) Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-L)c\ Samis v. Industrial Comm n. 
590 P^d 328 (Utah 1979;, Redman Uarehouswf 
Corp. v. Industrial Commn. 22 Utah 2d 39fc. 454 
?26 283 (1969; Carkng v. Industrial Commn, 
16 Ulah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965;. 
4. 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980; 
5. 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980, 
6. 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965) 
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tv Biscuit illustrate? the shortcomings of 
the majority s interpretatior. Tne wore 
"accident/' when viewed in »olaiion. ma-
be used to denote both an unexpected oc-
currence which produces injury as weh as 
an unexpected injun Tne word "injun 
on the other hand, denotes a result ano no: 
a cause. Had the legislature only used tn< 
word "injury* in section 35-1-45 (U.C.A.. 
1953, $ 3^1-45 (Repl. Vol. 4B. 1974 ec. 
Supp.1986)). then that statute woulo cover 
all results regardless of the cause Had 
the legislature only used the word "acc> 
dent," then 1 would agree with the majori-
ty's holding today that the legislature in-
tended to cover both the cause and the 
result In fact however, the legislature 
has used both words "injury" and "acci-
dent" It follows that the word "accident" 
must be interpreted as focusing upon the 
cause and not the result In short, the 
majority's interpretation writes the word 
"injun-* out of the statute. Such a deci-
sion is unwarranted in my viev, 
Tne legislature recently amended sectior. 
35-1-45.7 but chose to leave intact the star-
dard which limits the payment of compel; 
sation to those injured "Dy accident arising 
out of or in the course of . . . employ* 
men: " f Moreover, the singular "injury by 
accident' standard has not been altered or 
amended since its inception in 1917* Tne 
legislature thus being satisfied with the 
Court h interpretation of tne tern "acci-
dent" in trie long line of cases beginning 
with Cariinp t Industrial Commission" 
I decline to embark upon a new effort to 
redefine that tern* 
STEWART, Justice: (dissenting* 
I dissent Tne majority defines the stat-
utory term "accident* to mear "unex-
pected result." regardless of whether it is 
produced by a usual or an unusual event. 
The majority also defines the term "arising 
out of or in the course of employment1 to 
7. Act of Jan 27, 1984, ch. 75. § 1. 1984 Utah 
Laws 610, 610 
S. U.CA.. 1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl.Vol 4B, 1974 
ed., Supp.1986). 
ATRIAL CO^TN Itar 2<< 
) 19 (Uah 191* 
impose iega) and medical causation reouirt-
rnenu Sec U.C.A.. 1953, $ 3?-1-4: 
Curiously, tne requirement of "legal cat 
satior" has two difierent meanings de-
pending upon the physical condition of tm 
worker at tne time he is mjurec A wonte* 
havinp no preexisting medical condition or 
handicap need only prove that trie acciden* 
was caused tn a "usual or ordinary exe*-
tior. " But for congenital!} handicappec 
persons and for persons who have suffered 
preexisting industrial injuries (which pre-
sumably have left the worker with some 
physical weakness or deterioration), legal 
causation has a different meaning Such a 
worker may receive compensation only if 
the "employment contribution" to the inter-
nal breakdown is "greater than that of 
nonemployment life " According to the 
majority, such a worker must now prove 
that his internal breakdown was caused by 
"aw unusual or extraordinary exertion " 
in order to establish the requisite legal 
causation, even though the majority opin-
ion itself criticizes at length the "usual-un-
usual distinction as a means of proving 
causation " How the majority can reject 
that standard for persons having no preev 
isung condition, yet emDrace that standard 
for persons witn preexisting conditions, is 
baffling 
Furthermore, the difference between the 
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" which 
a worker with a preexisting condition mus: 
demonstrate and the "usual exertion" 
which a person witn no preexisting condr 
tion must demonstrate is far from-clear 
The latter standard Is lo be judged with 
respect to the " normal nonemployment 
life of this or any other person" Tne 
Court emphasizes that the "precipitating 
exertion must be compared with the usual 
wear and tear and exertions of nonem 
pioyment life, not the nonemployment life 
of the particular worker " What the term 
"usual wear and tear and exertions of non-
employment" means is not defmed by the 
9. Act of March IS, 1917. ch 100, f 52a. 1917 
Utah Laws 306. 322-23 
10. 16 Utah 2d 26C. 399 ?26 202 (1965) 
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majorin Th( fev examples se; ou: o< 
little to explain the concept aimed at. othe^ 
tnan to suggest that tne term means som*-
thing more tnari simp!*., hfe-sustaining a' 
tiviuer 
1 wholly fail to understand why persons 
wTho have a preexisting condition should t* 
placed in the disadvantaged position, u 
deed the near-remediiess position, that tin 
majority opinion imposes upon them Tnt 
purpose of the Second Injun Fund is U> 
provide compensation for workers who 
have preexisting medical conditions and 
therefore run a greater risk of injury wher 
they expose themselves to the hazards of 
the work place But the law should en-
courage such persons to work rather than 
encouraging them to abandon the work 
force for some kind of unearned support 
This Court has repeatedly stated that the 
Second Injury Fund was designed to en-
courage employers to hire persons with 
preexisting conditions by spreading the 
risk throughout the industry to assure such 
persons that their injuries will be cared for 
without imposing extraordinary liabilities 
on the employer* who hire them Inter, 
mountain Smelting Corp. i. Capttanc. 
610 P.2d 334. 337 (litah 1980) McPkxc r 
United States Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 50; 
505 (Utah 1976) Soaety certainly ought u 
favor those policies which encourage pec-
pie to work, rather than policies that deter 
employers from offering gainful employ 
ment to those who have a higner risk of 
work-related iniun Tnere is litue person 
a) or aocial benefit from & policy that tend* 
to discourage persons from working be 
cause of pnor injuries or disabilities 
Further, it is fundamental!) unfair and 
flatly inconsistent with the basic purposes 
of the workmen s compensation laws to 
impose higher standards for compensation 
on those with preexisting medical condi-
tions than on those without Tort law gen 
erally does not do so. A defendant in a 
negligence action is required to take the 
victim as the defendant finds him: whatev-
er unusual vulnerabilities the victim may 
have art disregarded. That principle 
should not be, and until now has not beer*. 
different m workmen s compensation law 
whicr, is really a substitute for ton lav 
remedies in short, handicapped or prev> 
ousiy injured persons who are injured by 
an industrial accident are simply discrimi-
nated against by having to meet the majon 
ty s rigorous legal cause requirement 
1 am also unable to understand how an 
administrative law judge the Industrial 
Commission, or an appellate court is sup-
posed to determine what "typical nonem-
ployment activities* are "in today's socie 
ty.' as they now must do for the purpose 
of determining legal causation for workers 
with preexisting medical conditions. Does 
that mean what a typical sixty-f ive-year-old 
does or a typical twenty-one-year-old does 
during his or her nonemployment activi-
ties'/ Is it what a professional football 
player does in his leisure time or what a 
ballet dancer does0 Is it what a sedentary 
worker does in his or her off-hours or what 
a forest ranger does' 
Instead of defining a meaningful stan-
dard, the majority provides examples which 
supposedly illustrate the unarticulated 
principle Tne examples "include taking 
fuli garbage cans to the street, lifting and 
carrying baggage for travel, changing a 
fiat tire on an automobile, lifting a small 
child to chest height, and climbing the 
stairs in buildings ' These few examples, 
which I find to be arguable in any event 
since they reflect only wnat aome people 
may do from time to firm:, do not substitute 
for a legal standard 1 seriously wonder 
whether changing a flat tire on an automt-
bile is a typical activity w today's soaety. 
and ] do not know how much luggage the 
"typical" individual lifts or how far he or 
she carries it Tne point is that the major) 
ty- has not set forth a workable standard at 
all. In fact. I have serious doubt that such 
an artificial construct as "typical nonem 
ployment activities*' will produce more fair 
and rational decisions than our past cases. 
The majority simply assumes a "typical" 
individual for the purpose of establishing a 
rational standard. Unfortunately, disabili-
ties happen to real people, not to "average" 
people, and the law has always recognized 
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as much In short. I do not think that tm 
majority s newly established standard wil 
produce decisions one whit more consistent 
or rational than those produced in Un 
past1 
The majority also holds that an injured 
person must prove that the disability is 
''medically the result of an exertion or inju 
ry that occurred during a work-related ac 
tivity " With a degree of hope that 1 think 
is unwarranted, the majority states tha: 
M[t)he medical causal requirement will pre-
vent an employer from becoming a general 
insurer of his employees and discourage 
fraudulent claims." 1 am fearful that that 
hope is seriously misplaced 
Certainly Professor Larson, largely the 
source of the Court's new standards and 
analysis, is highly acclaimed in this field of 
law. but there is much to be said for the 
case-by-case approach in hammering out 
legal doctrine, even if it does on occasion 
produce inconsistencies 1 readily concede 
that present law needs to be rationalized 
and that some cases should be overruled 
because they are hopelessly inconsistent 
witn other cases, but 1 do not believe thai 
the law needs to be revolutionized in such a 
manner as to defeat those humane policies 
intended to allow for the injuries of work-
ers who come to the work place in an 
impaired condition 
1 also join the Chief Justices dissent 
ffVflU««tlVSHtt S> 
1. In my view, the decisions of this Court arc 
general h reconcilable with only a feu glaring 
exceptions and most of them prior to 19SC 
That there axe more inconsistencies the further 
Richard E HOLLOWAY. PiaintifT. 
v 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the 
STATE OF UTAH. Richard E Hollo 
way Trucking [Employer], and the 
Bute Insurance Fund [Insurance earn-
er for the Employer], Defendant*. 
No. 20621. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Nov. 21, 198C 
Virginius Dabney. Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff 
Dsvid L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., James R. 
Black. Man- A. Rudolph, Salt Lake City, 
for defendants 
STEWART, Justice 
Plaintiff Richard E. Holloway is a self-
employed truck driver. On July 11. 19&4. 
after driving for about six hours, he 
stopped at a rest stop He claims that he 
slipped while walking across an oil spili or, 
his way to the restroom and that the sbj 
caused him to jerk to regain his balance Af-
ter returning from the restroom, Holloway 
bent over to inspect one of his truck tares 
While crouching, he experienced an imme-
diate sharp pain in his back which made 
him fall to the ground, landing on his arms 
and jaw His wife, also a truck driver, 
drove for the rest of the trip Two days 
after the incident Holioway consulted a chi-
ropractor in Georpa "He consulted anoth-
er chiropractor on returning to Salt Lake 
City. Tne slip on tne oil spill was not 
mentioned in the reports of the chiropractors 
who examined Holiowsy. in the First Re-
port of Injury, or in the claimants report 
of how the injun- occurred. 
The Commission denied review of the 
administrative law judge's order. The 
judge ruled that the plaintiffs injun* was 
not the result of an "accident" as that term 
back one foes in our body of law is not particu 
lariv unexpected. In any event. I doubt that the 
new approach wil) produce unwavering consist 
ency over the years 
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Case No. 86000857 
LESTER WAYNE SMITH, 
Applicantf 
vs. 
SISCO HILTE and/or 
ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
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* 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on December 4, 
1986, at 10:00 o'clock a.m.. Said hearing was 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge. 
Applicant was present and represented by Sherlynn W. 
Fenstermaker, Attorney at Law. 
Defendants were represented by Henry K. Chai, II, 
Attorney at Law. 
^Second Injury Fund was joined at the time of the 
proceedings and was not represented at the hearing. 
The issues to be addressed in this matter are as follows: 
1. Whether the applicant sustained injuries as a result 
of a compensable industrial accident on March 25, 1986. 
2. Causal relationship of the injuries to the alleged 
accident. 
3. Temporary total disability compensation from March 25, 
1986 to November 24, 1986. 
4. Permanent partial impairment and apportionment of said 
impairment with defendant, Second Injury Fund. 
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5. Medical expenses including those for surgery on May 28, 
1986. 
Subsequent to the evidentiary hearing, the medical issues were 
submitted to a special panel appointed by the Administrative Law Judge. The 
Medical Panel Report was received and circulated to the parties. No 
objections were submitted to the Medical Panel Report. However, counsel for 
the defendant did submit legal memorandum regarding the issue of compensable 
accident. Counsel for the applicant responded on June 5, 1987. After 
reviewing the Medical Panel Report and the Memorandums submitted in this 
matter, the Administrative Law Judge is prepared to make a Findings of Fact 
and enter an Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant in this matter, Lester Wayne Smith, is a 40-year-old 
male, who, at the time of his industrial injury, was married and had four 
dependent children under the age of eighteen. At the time of his injury, the 
applicant was earning $7.63 an hour, working forty hours per week. The 
applicant began his employment with the defendants in November of 1985. His 
duties consisted of running a grinder and some general maintenance work. It 
was the defendants* business to clean steel molds and plate the molds with 
enforcing steel. 
On March 25, 1986, around 2:00 p.m., the applicant was running his 
grinder. His supervisor asked him to move some steel plating, which was used 
to reinforce the molds. The steel plates were generally banded together and 
varied in width and length from 8 feet to 12 feet by 14 inches. Most of the 
plates were anywhere from 1/4 inch thick to 3/8 inch thick. The individual 
plates would weigh between 50 to 80 pounds, depending on the size. To move 
the plates, they had to be unhanded and moved individually. The applicant had 
moved two or three plates in this manner. On the next plate, he bent over, 
placing one hand on top of the plate and one hand underneath and began to 
raise it. When he had it approximately a foot and a half from the top of the 
stack, or at approximately his waist level, the applicant felt a sharp snap in 
his low back just above the waistline. He had an immediate radiation of sharp 
pains into his right leg. There was some question about the size of the plate 
the applicant was moving. He initially estimated it to be 12 feet by 14 
inches and to weigh approximately 80 pounds. However, the initial doctor's 
report shortly after the incident, indicates that the plate weighed 
approximately 50 pounds. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge adopts that 
weight as the most probable weight. The applicant's pain was so sharp that he 
had to set the plate down, and he reported the incident to his supervisor. 
His supervisor had the applicant stay in the office for the remainder of the 
two hours of the shift doing light work. By the time he left for home, his 
pain had increased greatly and he developed a burning sensation in his right 
leg. 
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Because his condition had not improved the next morning, the 
applicant made an appointment with the chiropractor, Dr. Hansen. He received 
the proper industrial papers from his employer and submitted them to Dr. 
Hansen. X-rays were then taken. He commenced a course of manipulations and 
heat treatment and was directed to stay off work. The applicant was treated 
by the chiropractor for seven weeks. Because his condition had not improved 
at the end of the seven week period, Dr. Hansen referred him to Dr. Alan 
Hunstock, a neurosurgeon. 
The applicant first saw Dr. Hunstock in May of 1986. Dr. Hunstock 
directed him to Utah Valley Hospital for x-rays and a CT scan. After those 
tests had been completed, surgery was recommended. The surgery was performed 
on May 28, 1986, at Utah Valley Hospital. After his release, the applicant 
continued his follow-up care with Dr. Hunstock. The surgery was very 
successful in eliminating the applicant's right leg pain. He has had one or 
two small recurrences since the surgery, but they have been minor and have 
gone away quickly. He still has some backaches on a fairly regular basis, 
particularly in the morning. The only medication that he takes for pain is 
aspirin. The applicant was released to return to work on November 24, 1986. 
He was released with some restrictions regarding lifting and sitting. 
The applicant received a total of $1,750.10, in temporary total 
disability compensation which was paid from May 14, 1986 through June 5, 
1986. He was paid at the rate of $214.89 per week. 
The applicant has had several prior injuries. In 1978, while working 
for Tichner Ford, the applicant had an injury to his left knee. He was 
treated for that injury by Dr. Mendenhall. Although the incident was 
industrial, his benefits were denied because the applicant failed to report 
the incident to his employer. The applicant also sustained injuries to the 
little finger on his left hand in 1981, when it was cut on a steel plate. The 
tip was initially cut off and was sewn back on. The applicant has good use of 
the finger and was paid compensation for that injury. 
Although the applicant denies having had priDr back injuries or 
problems, the records of Dr. Mendenhall indicate that he did treat the 
applicant for some low back pain in March of 1980, and again in Hovember of 
1980. The treatment was primarily conservative but did include the use of a 
TENS unit and also some hospitalization. The records indicate that the 
incident occurred when the applicant bent over the fender of an automobile. 
The applicant has also had an injury to his head in February of 1984, 
while working in Park City. A nail gun, weighing approximately five pounds, 
fell and knocked him unconscious. At that time, he received treatment from 
Dr. Meyer. An MMPI test was given to the applicant following that injury. 
Dr. Meyer apparently diagnosed him as having a conversion disorder. 
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The medical panel assigned in this matter found that the applicant 
had an overall impairment of 12X of the whole person. Of that amount, 2% was 
assigned to his injury to his knee in February of 1978. The remaining 10% was 
attributed to the applicant's low back problems with 3/10 being attributed to 
the injuries in March of 1980, and 7/10 being attributed to the industrial 
accident in March of 1986. It was the panel's opinion that there was a 
medically demonstrable causal connection between the applicant's low back 
problems and the industrial accident of March 25, 1986, and that the industrial 
injury did medically aggravate a pre-existing impaired condition of the 
applicant. It was also the panel's opinion that the surgery which was 
performed on May 28, 1986, was necessary for the applicant to recover from the 
aggravation of the pre-existing condition. The panel found that the applicant 
was temporarily and totally disabled from March 25, 1986 until the date of 
November 24, 1986, when he was released by his treating physician. No 
objections having been received, the Administrative Law Judge will adopt the 
findings of the medical panel as her own. 
The defendants have submitted a Memorandum indicating that the 
applicant has not met the burden of legal causation as announced in the Allen 
vs. Industrial Commission decision. Counsel for the defendants has argued 
that the panel pointed out that the applicant's back problem could have been 
triggered by lifting much less than a fifty pound weight and that the fifty 
pound weight is similar to some of the everyday activities as discussed by the 
Court in the Allen decision. However, the Administrative Law Judge is not 
inclined to construe the Allen decision in the same light as the defendants. 
It should be pointed out the facts in this matter are not substantially 
different from those in the Giles case where the applicant had a substantial 
pre-existing condition, but his actual injury was triggered by unusual 
exertion. In that case, it was clear that the applicant's eye problem could 
have been triggered by something considerably less than the exertion made. 
However, the Court upheld the findings of a compensable accident in that 
case. The Administrative Law Judge feels that this is a similar situation. 
The lifting of an awkward steel plate which weighs approximately fifty pounds 
from a level which is approximately between the applicant's waist and knees 
seems to the Administrative Law Judge a somewhat unusual- exertion, particularly 
when it is viewed in light of the fact that the applicant had lifted several 
other steel plates in a similar manner just immediately preceding the 
occurrence. 
An adoption of the medical panel findings would indicate that the 
applicant is entitled to temporary total disability compensation at the rate 
of $229.00 per week for 34.857 weeks or a total of $7,982.25- Of this amount, 
the defendants have already paid a total of $1,750.10, leaving a remainder due 
and owing to the applicant of $6,232.15. Additionally, the defendants would 
be liable for a 7% permanent partial impairment of the whole person or 21.84 
weeks at the rate of $215.00 per week for a total of $4,695.60. The 
defendant. Second Injury Fund, would be liable for a 3% permanent partial 
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impairment or 9.36 weeks at the rate of $215.00 per week for a total of 
$2,012.40. An attorneys fee will be awarded in this matter based on the 
temporary total disability compensation and permanent partial impairment 
compensation minus the amounts of temporary total disability compensation 
already paid to the applicant. This would result in an attorney*s fee of 
$2,588.03. The defendant insurance carrier in this matter shall be entitled 
to reimbursement from the defendant, Second Injury Fund, for 30% of all 
temporary total disability compensation and medical expenses paid in this 
matter. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant in this matter, Lester Wayne Smith, sustained injuries 
as a result of a compensable industrial accident on March 25, 1986, and is 
entitled to benefits in accordance with the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, SISC0 Hilte and/or 
Zurich American Insurance, pay the applicant, Lester Wayne Smith, compensation 
at the rate of $229.00 per week for 34.857 weeks or a total of $7,982.25. Of 
this amount, the defendants have paid a total of $1,750.10, leaving a 
remainder due and owing to the applicant of $6,232.15, to be paid in a lump 
sum minus the attorney's fees to be awarded hereinafter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, SISC0 Hilte and/or Zurich 
American Insurance, pay the applicant compensation at the rate of $215.00 per 
week for 21.84 weeks or a total of $4,695.60, as compensation for a 7% 
permanent partial impairment resulting from injuries sustained in his 
industrial accident on March 25, 1986. Said amount is accrued and to be paid 
in a lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants pay all medical expenses 
incurred as the result of the industrial injury, said expenses to be paid in 
accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants pay Sherlynn W. 
Fenstermaker, attorney for the applicant, the sum of $2,588.03, as attorney's 
fees, said amount to be deducted from the accrued aforesaid award of the 
applicant. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury 
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as 
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to pay the applicant, Lester Wayne Smith, 
compensation at the rate of $2,012.40, as compensation for a 3% permanent 
partial impairment resulting from pre-existing conditions which were 
aggravated by the industrial accident on March 25, 1986. Said amount is 
accrued and to be paid in 8 lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Zurich American Insurance, 
shall be entitled to reimbursement for 30% of all temporary total disability 
compensation and medical expenses upon the submission of a verified petition 
to the Administrator of the Second Injury Fund indicating the amounts so 
expended. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
30^ day of July, 1987. 
ATTEST: 
/s/ Linda J. Strasburg 1 
Linda J. Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
Janet Li 
nistrative Laii 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No: 86000857 
LESTER WAYNE SMITH, * 
Applicant, * 
* 
vs. * 
* 
SISCO HILTE and/or * 
ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE and * 
SECOND INJURY FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On July 30, 1987, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding the 
applicant in the above-captioned case temporary total compensation, permanent 
partial impairment benefits and medical expenses related to a March 25, 1986 
back injury. Prior to the issuance of the Order, counsel for the defendant 
filed a Memorandum on the issue of legal causation. In that Memorandum, 
counsel for the defendant argues that the March 25, 1986 back injury is not 
compensable, because the applicant cannot establish legal causation, one of 
the elements of compensability per the Supreme Court case Allen v. the 
Industrial Commission, 729 P,2d 15 (Utah 1986). As the applicant had a 
previous back condition prior to the March 1986 lifting incident, counsel for 
the defendant maintains the applicant must be able to show that the injury 
occurred pursuant to unusual exertion in order to establish legal causation. 
Counsel for the defendant finds that the lifting of a 50 pound steel plate is 
not unusual exertion as it is similar to a list of activities the Court in 
Allen found require only normal or usual exertion. Counsel for the applicant 
responded to the defendant's pre-hearing Memorandum stating that the weight 
and manner of lifting involved in the March 25, 1986 .incident clearly takes 
the activity out of the usual exertion category. 
On October 2, 1987, pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-82.53, counsel for the 
defendant filed a Motion for Review of the Administrative Law Judge's July 30, 
1987 Order. Renewing the arguments earlier made in his pre-hearing 
Memorandum, counsel for the defendant argues that the Administrative Law Judge 
should not have awarded benefits, as the applicant failed to establish the 
legal causation element necessary for a finding of compensability. In the 
Memorandum supporting the Motion for Review, counsel for the defendant notes 
that the Industrial Commission has adopted a 20 pound standard for determining 
what lifting injuries will be considered unusually exertive. Counsel for the 
defendant maintains that use of this standard by the Administrative Law Judge 
is error as the Allen case list of activities requiring only normal exertion 
includes lifting activities that could involve items like the 50 pound plate 
lifted by the applicant. Specifically, counsel for the defendant notes that 
garbage cans and tires often weigh more than 20 pounds. Counsel for the 
applicant responds to this argument in a October 19, 198 7 Response to the 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
ADDENDUM E-l 
LESTER WAYNE SMITH 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
PAGE TWO 
Motion for Review. She states that the manner in which the applicant lifted 
the 50 pound plate has to be considered in determining the level of exertion 
involved in the March 25, 1986 incident. She notes that the applicant wasn*t 
lifting with two hands as would be done in the Allen list of lifting 
activities, but rather with one hand only. 
The sole issue to be determined by the Commission on review is 
Whether or not the applicant was injured pursuant to unusual exertion on March 
25, 1986, thereby establishing the legal causation element of compensability. 
The Commission adopts the Findings of Fact of the Administrative Law Judge 
with respect to the manner and weight involved in the March 25, 1986 lifting 
incident. Based on the Administrative Law Judge's findings, the Commission 
finds the lifting incident at issue involved unusual exertion. The Commission 
does not believe a typical non-employment activity of men and women in the 
latter part of the twentieth century includes lifting 50 pounds. It is 
conceivable that a tire or garbage can may weigh 50 pounds, but the Commission 
believes they typically weigh less than that. The Commission has adopted no 
absolute 20 pound standard to use in determining which lifting incidents will 
be considered unusually exertive. The 20 pound "standard" comes from a foot 
note in the Allen case where the Court quotes with approval Professor Larson 
Who states the "usual wear and tear of life - which certainly includes lifting 
objects weighing 20 pounds." The Commission finds each case must be 
determined based on its own facts and the Commission has been consistent in 
finding weight alone should not be the only consideration. In the instant 
case, the necessity of lifting comparatively heavy and awkward steel plates 
was a risk to the applicant caused by his employment that goes beyond what 
typically is required in non-employment life in general. Therefore, per 
Allen, liability for the injury caused by that risk is properly placed on the 
employer. Therefore, the Commission must affirm the Administrative Law 
Judge's finding that the March 25, 1986 accident meets the legal causation 
test and as result is compensable. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant's October 2, 1987 Motion 
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's July 30, 1987 Order is 
hereby affinned and final with further appeal to the _Court of Appeals only 
within the thirty (30) day time limit and as specified in U.C.A. 35-1-83. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake^City, Utah, this 
7&+ „ day of / / ^ ^ r ^ ^ 1987, 
ATTESJ^ 
f^cinda J. Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
^JSJJV^^^A 
^ £ * w 
Lenice L. Nielsen 
Commissioner 
Jrf>iri Florez 
ammissioner 
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